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COMMENT
COMPUTER RETRIEVAL OF THE LAW: A CHALLENGE
TO THE CONCEPT OF UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE?
When Professor Henry Hart was clerking for Mr. Justice
Brandeis, he was requested to find precedent for a rather obscure
point of law. Clerk Hart told the Justice that he had run the digests
high and low and found nothing on the requested point. "Whereupon
L.D.B. fixed him with a steely eye and asked, 'Have you thumbed the
Reports?' "1
The day is long past when such a request would provoke nothing
more than surprise; today's law clerk, conscious of the terrifying flood
of legal literature, would be incredulous. One study has indicated that
the number of words reported yearly in the United States Supreme
Court Reports is presently increasing at the rate of 8,000 words a
year.2 The same work has shown a similar increase in all the national
reporters.3  From 1658 to 1879, a period of some two hundred and
twenty-two years, the reported cases numbered about 407,000. From
1879 to 1932 they numbered about 1,121,000,1 and are estimated to be
increasing at the rate of 25,000 per year.' Furthermore, as one com-
mentator has remarked, "[t]he rate of growth of the statutes is even
more exponentially determined than in the instance of case law, and
all of them pale into insignificance relative to the rate of growth of legal
periodical literature." 6
Lawyers and law librarians, concerned that the sheer volume of
legal literature will eventually impair its efficient use, have attracted
the aid of the computer sciences in devising systems of storage and
retrieval. These systems have ranged from mechanical adaptations of
iWiener, Decision Prediction by Computers: Nonsense Cubed-and Worse, 48
A.B.A.J. 1023, 1026 (1962).
2 L. ALLEN, R. BROOKS, & P. JAMES, AUTOMATIC RETRIEVAL OF LEGAL LIIERATURE
-WY AND How 12 (1962).
3 Id. at 17. The average annual increase shown for all the West regional reporters
between 1938 and 1948 was 1.75 million words.
4 Dickerson, Electronic Computers and the Practical Lawyer, 14 J. LEGAL ED.
485, 486 (1962).
6 Harris, Judicial Decision Making and Computers, 12 ViiL. L. REv. 272, 274
(1967).
GKayton, Retrieving Case Law by Computer: Fact, Fiction and Future, 35 GEO.
WAsH. L. REv. 1, 6-7 (1966). Some indication of the inundation of all types of legal
literature is given by the accumulation of volumes in the legal collection of the Library
of Congress. In 1900, the Library held 100,000 volumes on law. By 1930 this number
had increased to 250,000 and, by 1958, to 950,000. AILExN, BROOKS & JAlms, supra
note 2, at 22.
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present manual research and retrieval methods 7 to retrieval by statis-
tical analysis of stored bodies of "indexless" legal literature." However,
as these systems become increasingly more sophisticated, a greater
degree of scientific and legal expertise is needed to successfully weld the
fields of law and computer programming into a manageable whole.
So long as these projects were still largely experimental in nature,
the fact that legal skill might be involved in operations performed on
legal materials was largely a matter of private concern; recently, how-
ever, several groups have been organized to offer computerized research
and retrieval services on a commercial basis. In the context of this
commercial application, it becomes relevant to examine the sale of these
computerized research services in the light of the ethical and opera-
tional standards of the legal profession. How near do these services
come to the ill-defined boundaries of "unauthorized practice" of the
law? Is it proper to advertise or incorporate these services, when the
very notion of the "sale" of legal services is fraught with suspicious
overtones of unauthorized practice? A corollary to these questions is
one of purpose: for whom are these services intended, and to whom are
they to be made available? At present, they are, in the main, re-
stricted to members of the legal profession. However, if these op-
erations do prove to be commercially feasible and supplant present
research methods, undefined ethical issues may deprive the layman of
ready access to the body of the law.
THE TECHNIQUES OF COMPUTER RETRIEVAL OF THE LAW
Two of the basic legal research sources to which most lawyers
would immediately make reference are the West Digest System and
its companion, the indexed National Reporter System. It is evident
that these bibliographic or book tool services, sanctioned by long legal
use, are ethically unimpeachable. 9 Any mechanical adaptation of these
services which would use the same principles of indexing and would
stand in the same relation to a lawyer as would a West Reporter would
7 See, e.g., Morgan, The "Point of Law" Approach, 62M MODEr Us Es OF LAN-
GUAGE IN LAw 44 [hereinafter cited as M.U.L.L.].
8 See, e.g., the system proposed by John C. Lyons of the Graduate School of Pub-
lic Law, George Washington University, in Eldridge & Dennis, The Computer as a
Tool for Legal Research, 28 LAW & CONTEMP. PRoB. 78, 92-94 (1963).
9 Because these constitute the basic source of the law for most lawyers, and the
index system is the only presently feasible way of conducting research, their necessity
makes their irreproachability seem self-evident. Nevertheless the frontispiece to every
Commerce Clearing House Tax Court Reporter contains the following disclaimer:
This publication is designed to provide accurate and authoritative information
in regard to the subject matter concerned. It is sold with the understanding
that the publisher is not engaged in rendering legal, accounting, or other pro-
fessional service. If legal advice . . . is required, the service of a competent
professional person should be sought. (Emphasis added.)
This disclaimer is prescribed in American Bar Ass'n, Statements of Principles with
Respect to the Practice of Law 8 (Sept. 1, 1964) (from a Declaration of Principles
jointly adopted by a Committee of the A.B.A. and a Committee of Publishers and As-
sociations).
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similarly seem above reproach."° Such a mechanical adaptation is the
"Point of Law" approach developed in 1957 at Oklahoma State
University by the late Professor Robert T. Morgan."1 Trained per-
sonnel (presumably similar to those employed by West Publishing
Company) would analyze the legal materials for issues and concepts,
extracting a word, phrase or paragraph which identifies the issue or
concept under analysis.' Each concept is assigned a numerical ma-
chine code. The computer produces an alphabetical list of the concept-
identifying words or phrases, each with its corresponding code number.
From this list, the searcher selects those concepts which identify his
problem and presents its corresponding number to the computer, which
then searches its memory bank for the appropriate references.' 3
One of several characteristics common to both the West and
Morgan systems is that the exercise of any legal skill in constructing
the research system is completed before any person would have access
to them.' 4 These systems are simply the vehicle of the reported law.
They pass along, as an added convenience to the searcher, a pre-
structured system of general categories which are derived from an
analysis of past legal events. The formulation of these categories calls
for a legal skill much like that involved in assembling a case book:
it is the scholar's analysis of historical legal fact rather than the prac-
titioner's concern with a present factual situation.'s
'0 That a computerized retrieval service invites comparison with manual legal
services is recognized by the American Bar Association's Standing Committee on Un-
authorized Practice of Law. In the Committee's last annual report, it was noted that
"[b]asically, Electronic Data Retrieval is unobjectionable so long as it is merely a
means of storing textual information for later retrieval. In that respect, it is similar
to a library. So long as it is a library, there would appear to be no unauthorized
practice of law problems present" 33 UNAUTHORIZED PRacricE NEws 70 (Nos. 1 & 2,
1967).
1 The point of law approach may be characterized as an automated and vastly
accelerated West Key Number type system.
o . It cannot, however, be fairly characterized as more than a speeding up
Of our present unsophisticated methods.
EDRIDGE & DENNIS, supra note 8, at 86. Professor Morgan's system was never ex-
ploited commercially.
12 "A Point of Law Approach," in essence involves the analysis of each case
for the particular pertinent issues that are actually decided in that material.
The most significant feature of the system is that we are dealing with con-
cepts rather than words.
Morgan, supra note 7, at 44.
'3 See id.
The advantages of this duplication of the West system are threefold:
(1) the computer is capable of searching through its memory bank for
numerous "concepts" at the same time;
(2) all of the "law" in the memory bank is scanned. When no further
response is given by the machine, one can be certain that there is no more
"law" on the subject;
(3) the researcher is able to select the type of machine output he desires-
citations, citations and text, and so forth.
See Harris, Judicial Decision Making and Computers, 12 Vn.Li.. L. Rv. 272, 283-84
(1967).14 See Dickerson, supra note 4, at 493.
15 For a brief description of the process and personnel employed by West and
other services such as U.S. Law Week and Shepard's Citations, see M. MAYE, TH.
LAw-Yms 427-28, 433-34, 437-38 (1967).
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Another characteristic common to the two systems is that the
success of the searcher in obtaining a satisfactory answer to his prob-
lem depends not only on the facility with which he can use the digest-
index system, but also on the degree of clarity with which he can frame
his problem. The legal analysis of a particular factual situation is
performed by him before he frames his question for the computer.1" In
the West system, he is then provided with a written "data bank" of
West Reporters to which he is given specific references and cross-
citations so that he can find the appropriate page himself; in the
Morgan system, the machine performs the task of locating the page
or citation by rapidly scanning the stored data. Once the retrieved
materials are placed in the hands of the searcher, he must exercise his
legal judgment in assessing their application to the facts with which
he is concerned." Thus, the two steps in this retrieval process which
call for a significant exercise of legal judgment are: (1) the analysis
of a factual situation before a search question is framed and (2) the
analysis of the body of law which the system makes available. Both
of these analyses are performed by the user.
As automated systems of retrieval become more complex, they
depart more radically from the West "model" of retrieval. One of
the most frequently voiced complaints against the West System is
that hierarchical indexing and digesting systems lack the flexibility to
adjust to changing concepts in the law."8 Very often, a change of a
major topic will require the wholesale reorganization of subtopics, not
only within the major topic, but within the material left under the
old topic as well. Moreover, the fact that each new decision must
be made to fit a predetermined pigeonhole requires the digester to
leave out those portions of the case for which no pigeonholes exist, or
'6 In this process there are two steps in which the machine definitely cannot
replace the trained attorney. The first is getting the facts and characterizing
the problem; the second is applying the law to the particular question. The
computer is merely a middle step. In other words, the attorney gets his facts,
characterizes his problem, and then the computer does a search for material
on this aspect of the law.
Morgan, supra note 7, at 47.
37 Needless to say, the information acquired by the researcher through the
computer will be in raw form. Effective advocacy will still require that the
materials be evaluated, organized and persuasively stated. The need for pro-
fessional skills will not be eliminated.
Wright, Continued Improvement in the Law, 52 A.B.A.J. 920, 921 (1966).
1s A good example which illustrates this problem is the Decennial Digest,
which is keyed to the National Reporter System. In the Fifth Decennial
Digest (covering the years 1937 thru [sic] 1946) all social security cases are
digested under Key Number 78.2 of the topic "Master and Servant," where
they occupy about 190 pages. However, in the Sixth Decennial Digest (cov-
ering the years 1947 thru [sic] 1956) "Social Security" became a major topic.
It now occupies a single 1,800 page volume entitled "Social Security and the
Public Welfare" and has an entirely new organization of Key Numbers. As
long as the research is confined to one ten year period covered by the particu-
lar Decennial Digest, little difficulty is encountered; but when a prior or sub-
sequent period is to be reviewed, the problem arises.
Kayton, Retreiving Case Law by Computer: Fact, Fiction and Future, 35 GEo. WASH.
L. Ruv. 1, 4 n.13 (1966).
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squeeze them into the nearest preconceived mold-no matter how bad
the fit. 9 Therefore, one of the most frequent departures from the
West System has been a rejection of the standard hierarchical index.
The mechanics of computerized retrieval of case or statutory law
are especially suited to storage and retrieval of "indexless" bodies of
legal literature. If the user-searcher can select a word which either
represents or is integrally involved in the concept for which he is
searching (either through his own skill or knowledge or through the
use of indices or thesauri), the computer can search for that word in
its "data bank" and identify or reproduce the document in which it
appears. This is fundamentally the type of system which is employed
by Automated Law Searching, Inc., (A.L.S.) a division of Aspen
Systems Corporation.
A.L.S. has on tape, at the present time, the complete text 2 of the
statutes of nine states, the text of the United States Code, the Internal
Revenue Code and Regulations, all Pennsylvania Supreme and Superior
Court cases since 1960,21 and all Third Circuit and United States
Supreme Court cases since 1950.22 Because this is a "full text"
system, there is no indexing to require the exercise of legal judgment
prior to storage.23 The auxiliary research tools are a "thesaurus" and
a "Key-Word-in-Context" (KWIC) index. These are prepared by
the computer's analysis of a stored data base before any search of the
material is undertaken. A thesaurus is merely a list of all the words
19 See Wilson, Comtter Retrieval of Case Law, 16 Sw. L.J. 409, 411-12 (1962).
Occasionally, however, the digesters will come up with a new category. See
28 U.S.C.A. § 1651, note 281, at 153 (1966).
20 The West headnotes and annotations are not put on tape since they are copy-
righted by West. Cf. Bank Law Pub. Co. v. Lawyers' Co-Operative Pub. Co., 169 F.
386 (2d Cir. 1909).
No copyright may be maintained in state or federal court opinions, Banks v.
Manchester, 128 U.S. 244 (1888); Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. (8 Pet.) 591, 668
(1834) (dictum). See also 17 U.S.C. § 8 (1964) ; Note, Piracy in High Places-Gov-
ernmnat Publicatio-s and Copyright Law, 24 GEO. WAs H. L. REv. 423 (1956). How-
ever, it appears that an official reporter paid by the state government may, unless it
is otherwise provided by state law, claim copyright in headnotes and synopses written
by him. Callaghan v. Myers, 128 U.S. 617 (1888).
It appears that use of copyrighted material in computerized retrieval systems
would constitute infringement. See Benjamin, Computer and Copyright, 152 SCIENCE,
April 8, 1966, at 181.
21 For each Pennsylvania Supreme or Superior Court case prior to 1960, A.L.S.
has on tape the full text of the precis that is published immediately preceding the case
in the official state report.
2 Automated Law Searching, Inc., Computer Service Applied to Legal Research,
Feb. 1, 1967 (mimeo). Since that time, A.L.S. has added cases from two more states,
Second Circuit decisions since 1950, and decisions of the Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Commission, and is continuing to add material. Letter from A.L.S. to the
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, April 24, 1968.
23 In this respect, the A.L.S. system differs from the West or Morgan approach.
"The process of putting the full text in machine-readable form is almost purely me-
chanical to the extent that no human judgment enters into the transition process."
Kayton, .rzpra, note 18, at 15. See also Dickerson, The Elect'onic Searching of Law,
47 A.B.A.J. 902, 903 (1961).
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in the data base showing how many times they appear and in how
many subdivisions of the material they appear. By determining the
frequency of a word's appearance, the searcher can roughly determine
the amount of material the computer will retrieve with the single word
as a "program" or command. If there are several words which identify
the concept, the searcher can increase or decrease the number of docu-
ments or references the machine will return by linking these words with
"operators." These are connectives roughly corresponding to the
linking characteristics of "and," "or," "appearing together," etc. By
making the terms he has chosen conjunctive or disjunctive, the searcher
can make the mesh of his word "net" finer or coarser in order to
increase or decrease the "catch" of references which he can obtain
from the machine. The KWIC index is an alphabetical list of sig-
nificant words in the data base. Along with each word, the machine
reproduces the words in the text immediately preceding and following
the "key" word so that the searcher can examine the context in which
any significant search word might appear. The KWIC index is some-
times used to frame other searches, but is more often used to get the
searcher from the search output to a reference book.24
Two characteristics of the A.L.S. system should be noted. In
the first place, legal skill in selecting the appropriate words and
making them into a research "question" by the use of "operators" is
wholly that of the searcher.25  Thesauri (word frequency) and KWIC
indices are largely the mechanical product of the machine operation.
The only significant operation involving the legal skill of the A.L.S.
staff members takes place when searchers are taught the mechanics
of question-framing and program construction. After new users re-
ceive basic instruction in the mechanics of the operation, they them-
selves "frame" the questions; however, before they are "programmed"
into the computer, an A.L.S. staff member "reviews" the questions
framed by the user, and criticizes and corrects them if necessary in
light of the legal context in which the question is asked. After several
tries, the user usually becomes adept at constructing his questions and
the intervention of A.L.S. staff members is no longer necessary.
26 The
second major characteristic of A.L.S. is that its "product" is only
the complete "raw" text of statutes and/or cases (or, in the alternative,
2 4 See Horty, The "Key Word in Combinatio" Approach, 62M M.U.L.L. 54,
59-60.
25 See Eldridge & Dennis, supra note 8, at 87-89 (1963). "Searches are accom-
plished by the researcher himself." Id. at 87.
While the user structures his question in terms of Key Words and connectives,
there is no need for him to be familiar with the technical aspects of computer language.
"The person requesting a computer search has the responsibility of selecting the words
to be used in the search and arranging them in groups likely to produce the poten-
tially relevant statutes. The personnel of the Health Law Center will arrange the
searches in the format required for the computer." University of Pittsburgh Health
Law Center [now A.L.S.], Searches of Law by Computer 15 (undated pamphlet).
26 Interview with A.L.S. staff member at the University of Pittsburgh, August
10, 1967.
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a list of the appropriate citations) .27 There is no digesting or analysis
performed by the staff members for the user; he receives merely the
machine "printout" with marginal annotations indicating the appear-
ance of the specified "key word." 2
The time and expense involved in putting full "raw" text on
tape " has led to experimentation with systems which store less than
the full text of cases or statutes. Some systems store only the words
of a case or statute which have been "translated" into a highly stylized
kind of language which is particularly valuable in programming a
machine for retrieval."° Although they offer great flexibility in re-
search techniques, such systems involving stylized or statistically deter-
mined data bases are still experimental and not presently used by any
commercial research center.
One commercial service which is based on less than a full text
data base is Law Research Service, Inc. (L.R.S.) which has its head-
quarters in New York City.3 From the user's point of view, the
L.R.S. service begins with a computer thesaurus-a loose-leaf
binder which contains an alphabetical list of words and phrases called
"descriptors." Each descriptor heading may be further alphabetically
subdivided among categorical subheadings, each descriptor entry having
its own ten-digit code number.3 From the thesaurus the searcher
27 For the case materials for which A.L.S. has only precis on tape, see note 21
supra, the full text product consists of the printouts of these summaries. The sum-
maries are those printed in the official report and are not written by A.L.S. staff
members. Id.28 See Eldridge & Dennis, supra, note 25, at 88.
[In the A.L.S. system], the machine is not intended to make the final selection
but only to produce a manageable fund of promising materials (all that are
responsive to the specific question), from which the searcher makes the final
selection ....
. [T]he machine is designed not to replace legal judgments but to re-
duce the kind of mechanical drudgery that lawyers need to avoid if they are to
serve their clients adequately. Rather than eliminating the necessity of think-
ing through the basic legal problem, it highlights the need for careful analysis,
not only in framing the inquiry, but in evaluating the results.
Dickerson, supra note 23, at 904 (speaking of a retrieval demonstration by John Horty,
A.L.S. founder, at the eighty-third annual meeting of the A.B.A.).
29 This process has recently been made less expensive and time-consuming by the
introduction of photo-sensitive electronic "readers" which are capable of "reading"
special typeface and transmitting the resulting electronic impulses directly into the
computer. Technological advances such as this, which have been readily assimilated
into the field of computerized retrieval of legal materials, hold great promises for the
future of these services.
30 Such a system has been developed at the Western Reserve University Center for
Documentation and Communication. See Melton & Bensing, Searching Legal Litera-
ture Electronically: Restslts of a Test Program, 45 MINN. L. REv. 229 (1960) ; Melton,
The "Semantic Coded Abstract" Approach, 62M M.U.L.L. 48 (1962).
31L.R.S. "has over one million abstracts of cases stored in its magnetic tape
library, including all the New York cases officially reported since 1846 and all offi-
cially reported federal cases." Harris, supra note 5, at 293.
32 Two successive descriptor entries, for example, may read "UxnFoRm Com-
CIAL CODE-INvESTMENT SEcuRrrIEs-DuREss" and "UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE-
INVSTMENT SEcUTrrIEs-FoRGERY," each having its own code number. Law Research
Service, Inc., Sample Page from Corporations, Contracts and Business Law Com-
puter Thesaurus (1966).
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selects those entries which most closely characterize his problem; the
code numbers for those entries are fed into a Western Union teletype
connection with the L.R.S. computer. 33 Within minutes the computer
will respond with citations of cases in any jurisdiction specified, which
are relayed to the requesting party via the teletype system.
Very little is actually known about the technical side of L.R.S.
operations, or how their computer programs are prepared.3 4 It would
seem, however, that it resembles the Morgan system " with its elaborate
prior indexing rather than the A.L.S. system, which is based upon the
occurrence of significant words in the actual text of the legal materials
cited. 8 Because of the rapid feedback from the L.R.S. computer, it
would appear that there is no intervention by staff members between
the searcher and the computer system. The searcher characterizes and
analyzes his problem, finds the significant entries in the thesaurus, and
has direct access to the computer data bank much in the same way as
the manual researcher has direct access to case law through the tra-
ditional West system.37  For the user who does not have access to
the system's thesauri, L.R.S. offers a "Special Evaluation Query"
service. The L.R.S. subscriber who uses this service transmits by mail
a form which will enable L.R.S. staff members to make for him the
proper selection from the thesauri. Each form (marked at the top:
"for The Profession only") provides space for the subscriber to ask
a specific question which he wishes to research as well as a statement
of the factual context of the problem." Within twenty-four hours,
the subscriber receives case citations which the computer has indicated
are on point with the problem he has described. This "Evaluation"
33 A subscriber may have a teletypewriter in his own office or he may communi-
cate by telephone with an "area director" who has direct Western Union teletype
communication with L.R.S.'s computer. L.R.S. has 150 branch representatives in 39
states. Levison, Automted Legal Research at the University of Florida College of
Law: Development of a New Service for Florida Lawyers, 41 FLA. BAR J., February,
1967, at 80.
34 Exactly how cases are gathered, analyzed, processed and stored is regarded as
a "trade secret." Telephone conversation with L.R.S. staff member, August 16, 1967.
An L.R.S. advertisement merely states that the service has "gathered and indexed"
state and federal cases. Law Research Service, Inc., Legal Research by Computer
(undated brochure).
35See notes 11-13 supra and accompanying text.
36 See notes 20-24 supra and accompanying text. The A.L.S. [Pittsburgh] sys-
tem would seem to hold greater promise for dealing with the increasing volume of
legal literature in that its new approach does away with the handicaps attendant on
a hierarchical indexing system. See note 18 supra. Because the A.L.S. system does
away with the need for pre-digesting and indexing, it eliminates from research the
need for judgment on the part of the classifier of the significance of the case he will
store in the system.
37 The L.R.S. system presupposes that the user has access to a set of West (or
official state) reporters since its principal product is a list of citations. Full text"printouts" are available, but these are supplied by L.R.S. staff members who find the
computer-dictated citations themselves and merely type out the text of the case. Inter-
view with L.R.S. staff member, November 16, 1967. But see note 39 infra.
38 "[W]e ask that you include essential background material in the factual state-
ment. ... This will enable us to tailor our answer factually, as well as legally, to your
particular problem." Law Research Service, Inc., Your Special Evaluation Query
Service (undated instruction pamphlet).
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service does differ from the direct access service in that some analysis
on the part of L.R.S. staff members is called for after the subscriber
transmits his problem to the service and before he receives a reply.3 9
Rapid technological advances in the computer sciences indicate
that the techniques of legal retrieval discussed above are still in a stage
of experimentation and development. 40 Because the products of these
services and the techniques by which they are produced are variable
quantities, any attempt at an exposition of their professional status in
the legal community must be tentative at best. However, the fact that
their procedures are sufficiently stable to form a basis for commercial
operation justifies some exploration of their impact on the practice of
law. At the same time, it should be acknowledged that the governing
order of the legal profession-the law of unauthorized practice and
legal ethics-is not subject to easy analysis and is presently under-
going a significant reorientation. 41
3 9 
It would seem that the L.R.S. staff does have a role in servicing special
evaluation queries. Referring to an "unnamed" computer service which was the subject
of a news story in the December 3, 1963, issue of the New York Times, one com-
mentator observed that "these results are then reviewed by the company's legal staff,
and the four most relevant decisions among those cited are produced in full by the
printer. This, together with a list of all the other citations the computer has printed
out, is then sent to the lawyer who made the inquiry." Landes, Project: Automated
Legal Research, 52 A.B.A.J. 730, 732 (1966). The New York Times article, which
deals only with L.R.S., notes that "the relevant cases were then checked by staff ex-
perts for a history of case law and a determination of their status." New York Times,
Dec. 3, 1963, at 45, col. 2. The same article also noted that "[a spokesman] empha-
sized, however, that the service was just a mechanical function. 'Neither we nor the
machines,' he said, 'attempt to analyze the processed data.' " Id. at 73, col. 1. Some
of the statements in the article may be inconsistent with the present operation of the
system. See text accompanying notes 31-38 supra.
In regard to the L.R.S.'s "product," one source noted that a requesting attorney
receives a memorandum which contains
(1) the full text printout of several of the most relevant cases; (2) citations
of additional applicable cases, statutes and other authorities; (3) a discussion
and analysis of the facts contained in the attorney's question; and (4) a dis-
cussion of the applicable law.
Note, Jurimetrics: The Electronic Digital Computer and Its Application in Legal
Research, 50 IowA L. RE.v. 1114, 1131 (1965). An L.R.S. staff member, however,
asserted that only citations and text printouts constituted the service's product. Inter-
view with L.R.S. staff member, November 16, 1967.
It would seem inaccurate to characterize this "Special Evaluation Query" as a
purely legal analysis although it does seem to bear a resemblance to the unlicensed
law clerk who is requested to find the law dealing with a particular factual situation.
The "Special Evaluation Query" form does call for an analysis of the facts and issues
involved by the subscriber attorney before submission of the question. The instruction
pamphlet also cautions: "We cannot and would not presume to render or substitute our
opinions for your trained analysis." Law Research Service, Inc., Your Special Evalu-
ation Query Service (undated instruction pamphlet).
A recent letter from A.L.S. indicates that Landes' description of the staff's role in
servicing Special Evaluation Queries may well be correct Letter from A.L.S. to the
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, April 16, 1968.
4OSee text accompanying notes 29-30 supra. Such innovations may enable these
systems to reach a long sought-after goal, which is to "be able eventually to set up a
system that is simple enough to need no middle man between search requests and com-
puter." Covey, Infornmation Retrieval in Law: Problems and Progress with Legal
Computers, 67 DIcK. L. Rav. 353, 356 (1963).
41 See, e.g., United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217
(1967) ; Riggs, Unauthorized Practice and the Public Interest: Arizona's Recent
Constitutional Amendment, 37 S. CAL. L. Rav. 1 (1964).
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UNAUTHORIZED PRACTICE OF LAW
Historically, the law of unauthorized practice grew out of judicial
power to regulate practice at the bar." In the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries, attorneys were recognized as officers of the courts, under the
supervision of the judges.4" A natural corollary of the power to regu-
late admission to the bar was the power to prevent laymen from
practicing law, enforced through the contempt power of the courts.44
Traditional analysis posed two questions: does the activity in question
constitute the "practice of law" ?-if so, is it "authorized"?
The Practice of Law
Attempting to define the "practice of law" is no easy task. Some
jurisdictions have no legislation dealing with unauthorized practice,
and instead rely on a judicially articulated doctrine.4 5 Some states
attempt to list those functions which may be considered "practice";
usually, these specify such activities as representing another before a
court, drawing up legal papers and so forth.46 At the other extreme,
some statutes merely prohibit unauthorized practice without attempting
any definition of practice." Still other statutes are framed in general
terms; these may provide that "render[ing] any legal service for any
other person . . . shall be deemed to be practicing within the mean-
ing of this section." 4
Such broad language encourages equally broad judicial inter-
pretation. One court, in considering whether a town clerk, in verifying
titles to land, was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law,
remarked:
Attempts to define the practice of law have not been par-
ticularly successful. The reason for this is the broad field
42 See vom Baur, Administrative Agencies and the Unauthorized Practice of Law,
24 UNAUTHORIZED PRAcTIcE NEWS 1 (Fall, 1958).
43 See Richmond, Early English Law Schools: The Inns of Court, 48 A.B.A.J.
254 (1962).
44 A significant body of case law asserts that the right of a court to regulate the
practice of law is not dependent on legislative authorization. See, e.g., Hoffmeister
v. Tod, 349 S.W.2d 5 (Mo. 1961) (legislature may aid court by penalizing unauthor-
ized practice, but cannot interfere with court's inherent power to regulate). Arizona
realtors, in order to secure the right to fill out simple conveyances, bypassed an attempt
to secure favorable legislation and obtained instead a constitutional amendment. See
Riggs, note 41 supra.
45 See, e.g., In re Fletcher, 107 F.2d 666, 668 (D.C. Cir. 1939), cert. denied, 309
U.S. 664 (1940) (relying on "the inherent power of courts of general jurisdiction to
define and regulate the practice of law . . . not only in the court but also outside.").46 See, e.g., Mo. ANN. STAT. § 484.010 (1952).
4 7 See, e.g., ARIz. REv. STAT. ANN. § 32-261 (1956); CAL.. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§§ 6125-27 (West 1960); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 13, § 1 (Smith-Hurd 1963); WASH.
REv. CODE ANN. § 2.48.190 (1961).
48 WIs. STAT. ANN. § 256.30 (1957). See also the definition given in 7 Am. JuR.
2d s.v. Attorneys at Law § 73, at 94 (1963), which includes "rendering a service that
requires a legal knowledge or skill"
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covered. The more practical approach is to consider each
state of facts and determine whether it falls within the fair
intendment of the term.49
Setting forth to find the "fair intendment of the term," courts have
traditionally found that certain actions usually involve "practice."
Thus, drawing up instruments which set forth or alter legal rights,5"
such as a will; "' handling uncontested probate matters; 52 or appearing
in court on behalf of another 53 are generally considered to be practice
of law. None of these services, however, are offered by the commercial
retrieval agencies considered above.
There is considerable evidence that another category, the giving
of legal advice to clients in the context of a particular factual situation,
also constitutes the practice of law.54 One court has defined the practice
of law as including "advice to clients" 5r and other courts have said
that, while filling in the blanks on a legal form may be a mere clerical
act, yet, where the instrument is shaped from facts and circumstances
requiring a knowledge of the law,56 or where the scrivener elicits the
proper information, considers it and acts thereon,5" he is practicing law.
49 Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 329, 22 A.2d 623, 625 (1941).
Cf. Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 398, 312 P.2d 998
(1957):
Our legislature has never undertaken to define the practice of law. Though
this court has made findings in specific cases holding that certain acts did or
did not constitute the practice of law, unfortunately the decisions cannot be
reconciled with each other; do not reflect a definite guide or policy and afford
slight assistance in resolving the issues before us.
Id. at 411, 312 P.2d at 1005.
50 See, e.g., Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 398,
312 P.2d 998 (1957). Even though the court denominated as "practice" the drawing
up of the conveyances, it declined to enjoin this activity, finding it not contrary to
public policy.
51 A deputy surrogate and a title clerk were held in contempt of court for draw-
ing up a will in In re Baker, 8 N.J. 321, 85 A.2d 505 (1951).
52A law clerk was held to be practicing law when he handled an uncontested
probate case in Ferris v. Snivley, 172 Wash. 167, 19 P.2d 942 (1933).
5 3 In Clements v. State, 141 Tex. Crim. 108, 147 S.W.2d 483 (1941), a law clerk
was fined for representing a client in a divorce proceeding. An exception to this
general rule has recently been made to permit some law students to appear in court
on behalf of the indigent. See In re Cornell Legal Aid Clinic, 26 App. Div. 2d 790,
273 N.Y.S. 2d 444 (1966); Cleary, Law Students in Criminal Law Practice, 16
DEPAUL L. REv. 1 (1966); McArdle, Law Students' Participation in National De-
fender Projects, 24 LEGAL Am BRIEFCASE 262 (1966).
54This definition would not seem to cover the case of abstract legal advice. Even
on such occasions, however, some factual context is implicit: when a layman asks an
unlicensed law clerk about the law concerning the duty to erect fences around open
elevator shafts, implicit in the question is in all probability that the interrogator has
such an elevator shaft about which he is concerned. See note 62 infra. See also
State ex rel. Florida Bar v. Sperry, 140 So. 2d 587, 591-92 (Fla. 1962), rezvd on other
grounds, 373 U.S. 379 (1963) (advice must affect important legal rights where pro-
tection of those rights requires knowledge of law greater than that possessed by
average citizen).
r5In re Duncan, 83 S.C. 186, 189, 65 S.E. 210, 211 (1909).
N See In re Matthews, 57 Idaho 75, 82, 62 P.2d 578. 581 (1936).
57 See People ex rel. Ill. Bar Ass'n v. Schafer, 404 Ill. 45, 54, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 777
(1949).
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If the giving of legal advice in a specific factual context is the
"practice of law," one must consider the function exemplified by the
unlicensed law clerk. He rarely does research in a vacuum, looking
for law in the abstract. His search is usually framed and delimited by
a particular factual situation and the research memorandum which he
writes will apply the law as he finds it to those facts. This activity,
however, does not constitute the practice of law when the memorandum
is submitted to a licensed attorney who reviews the matter with his
own skill and experience, and passes the legal advice on to the client."
If, however, the clerk were to pass his memorandum directly on to the
client, he would be engaged in the practice of law.59 The significant
element distinguishing these two cases is the person for whom the
activity is done, that is, whether or not he is the proper object or
recipient of the advice given. Traditional analysis of the "practice of
law" has, as was indicated, usually emphasized the product-the service
rendered in each case.60 This is to be expected, since consideration of
the service to be given is a sine qua non of the law of unauthorized
practice. It is suggested, however, that the analysis advanced here-
in terms of the person for whom the service is rendered-is also a
significant element in the law of unauthorized practice.
Analysis in terms of the recipient of the service is to some
degree implicit in the recorded lore of unauthorized practice. The
Annual Report of the American Bar Association for 1927 included
in the definition of the practice of law "counsel . . . rendered in
respect of the rights, duties, obligations, liabilities or business relations
of the one requesting the service." 6  One judge has offered this
observation:
58 [The functions of an unlicensed law clerk] should be limited to work of a
preparatory nature, such as research, investigation of details, the assemblage
of data and other necessary information, and such other work as will assist
the employing attorney in carrying the matter to a completed product, either
by his personal examination and approval thereof or by additional effort on
his part.
Ferris v. Snivley, 172 Wash. 167, 176-77, 19 P.2d 942, 945-46 (1933). The court
recognized that the nature of the work performed by a law clerk approached that of
his employer, and that a "line of demarcation as to where their work begins and
where it ends cannot always be drawn with absolute distinction or accuracy." Id. at
176, 19 P.2d at 945. See also Crawford v. State Bar of California, 54 Cal.2d 659, 355
P.2d 490, 7 Cal. Rptr. 746 (1960) (engaging in partnership with disbarred attorney
who performs functions greater than those of law clerk violates legal ethics).
59 If a lawyer requested his law clerk to draw up a memorandum of law which
would affect or clarify the lawyer's own personal legal rights (e.g., assisting the
lawyer in purchasing a house), the clerk would not be practicing law since the attor-
ney would in this case be acting as his own "filter."
60 Traditional analysis has taken this form largely because each case turns on the
particular factual situation involved. See People ex rel. Ill. State Bar Ass'n v. Schafer,
404 Ill. 45, 53, 87 N.E.2d 773, 777 (1949). There are some dicta that other considera-
tions are not relevant, see State ex rel. Johnson v. Childe, 139 Neb. 91, 94, 295 N.W.
381, 383 (1941). Such comment has largely been directed, however, to the contention
that the tribunal before which the acts are performed was determinative, i.e., that
judicial power to regulate practice did not extend to state administrative agencies.
61 Quoted in Ferris v. Snivley, 172 Wash. 167, 175, 19 P.2d 942, 945 (1933)
(emphasis added).
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This is the essential of legal practice-the representation and
the advising of a particular person in a particular situation.
The lectures of a law school professor are not legal practice
for the very reason that the principles enunciated or the
procedures advised do not refer to any activity in immediate
contemplation though they are intended and conceived to
direct the activities of the students in situations which may
arise. 2
One particular value of the analysis in terms of recipient is
that it explains the position of the law clerk and, at the same time,
points up the truly significant factor in those cases which speak in
terms of product; that is, it indicates that what characterizes the process
as the practice of law is that the immediate recipient of the advice or
counsel will have his legal rights altered, clarified, explained or
affected in some manner thereby.' Thus, as indicated above, it is
not the practice of law for a law professor to convey certain information
to his class, while it would constitute legal practice were an unlicensed
professor to convey information to a layman in a context which would
indicate that the information would alter or define the latter's rights.
A.B.A. Guidelines
The last annual report of the American Bar Association Standing
Committee on Unauthorized Practice stated that further study of
computerized retrieval was taking place. However, in the way of
preliminary observations it noted that a retrieval system
is unobjectionable so long as it is merely a means of storing
textual information for later retrieval. In that respect, it is
similar to a library. So long as it is a library, there would
appear to be no unauthorized practice of law problems
present. When, however, the system becomes so sophisticated
62New York County Lawyers' Ass'n v. Dacey, 28 App. Div. 2d 161, 283 N.Y.S.2d
984, 998 (1967) (Stevens, 3., dissenting). The New York Court of Appeals reversed
the Appellate Division, adopting by a vote of 6 to 1 Justice Stevens' dissenting
opinion finding that the publication of Norman F. Dacey's book, How to Avoid Pro-
bate, did not constitute the practice of law. New York County Lawyers' Ass'n v.
Dacey, 21 N.Y.2d 694, - N.E.2d -, 287 N.Y.S.2d 422 (1967). Factually, the Dacey
case does not offer a good analogy to computerized retrieval. Dacey was engaged in
the distribution of information of a general nature, which was not in response to any
particular factual situation or request.
This distinction was also drawn in Shortz v. Yetter, 38 Pa. D.&C. 291 (Luzerne
County C.P. 1940), in which the defendant bad published a pamphlet giving legal
information which contained an offer to answer specific questions which might be
submitted by readers. The court modified a decree enjoining the publication of the
pamphlet to allow publication without the offer to give specific legal advice, but
continued to enjoin publication of "questions and answers involving expert or pro-
fessional knowledge...." Id. at 300. Cf. Grievance Comm. v. Dacey, 154 Conn. 129,
222 A.2d 339 (1966).
63 See Paul v. Stanley, 168 Wash. 371, 376-78, 12 P.2d 401, 404 (1932) ; Shortz v.
Yetter, 38 Pa. D.&C. 291 (Luzerne County C.P. 1940).
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that facts are fed into it from which the system draws legal
conclusions based on specific legal analysis, it would involve
the practice of law. On well established principles, these
services may be rendered only to lawyers, for as soon as the
spectrum of services becomes broader, so that the services are
rendered to non-lawyers, it impinges upon the unauthorized
practice of law."4
This statement illustrates that an analysis in terms of the user of a
retrieval system (the recipient of legal information) is particularly
applicable to the field of computerized retrieval. However, further
analysis in terms of the services presently offered and the preceding
discussion of the practice of law suggests that the A.B.A. position
may be both unnecessarily restrictive and, at the same time, unrealistic.
The thrust of the A.B.A. Committee statement is that if the
system draws legal conclusions based on specific legal analysis, it is
practicing law and must restrict its product to lawyers. Lawyers, in
other words, are proper users of such a system, while laymen are not.
The statement recognizes that the issue of unauthorized practice arises
only when a system provides some kind of legal analysis. As was
mentioned earlier, the A.L.S. (Pittsburgh) system makes the law
directly available to the searcher without the intervention of any inter-
mediary, whether indexer or analyst. The user is responsible for
analyzing his own problem and for selecting words which he believes
are significant in characterizing that problem. His selection of words
and the way in which he combines them with operators is the form
in which the query is "programmed" into the computer. Full "raw"
text is the product which is directly dispatched to the searcher without
interposition by staff members. It has been suggested above that legal
advice which affects or defines legal rights ' or is based on the analysis
of a particular fact situation may well constitute the practice of law.
66
Here, since there is no legal analysis by the system, it is not engaged
in the practice of law, and laymen as well as lawyers should be con-
sidered proper users.
The same reasoning applies to the L.R.S. (New York) standard
system of retrieval, in which the searcher is responsible for analyzing his
64 American Bar Ass'n Standing Comm. on Unauthorized Practice of Law, Annual
Report, 33 UNAUTHORIZED PRACrICE NEws 62, 70 (No. 1-2, 1967). These standards
have recently been explained and clarified in Lorinczi, When Does the Computer En-
gage in Unauthorized'Practice?, 54 A.B.A.J. 379 (1968). The latest draft of the
A.B.A. standards distinguishes "raw or library type" legal data retrieval services from
services which are "advisory or analytical," but continues to discuss availability in
terms of a "lawyer-layman" dichotomy. Id. at 380-81. The proposed standards call
for disclosure by commercial services of their general operational procedures; on the
basis of these disclosures, the A.B.A. will issue a "certificate of compliance" indicating
which type of service is being offered. Id. at 380.
05 See State ex rel. Florida Bar v. Sperry, 140 So.2d 587, 591 (Fla. 1962), rev'd
on other grounds, 373 U.S. 379 (1963) ; notes 56-57 supra and accompanying text.6 o See notes 58-59 slepra and accompanying text.
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own problem and choosing, from the computer thesauri, descriptors
which adequately characterize it. From that point on, the searcher is in
direct contact with the body of stored law via Western Union. He
receives back from the computer a typed list of citations which he, like
the A.L.S. subscriber, must analyze and apply to his problem. Because
there is no legal analysis performed by the system, it must be concluded
that, here also, laymen as well as lawyers should be given full access:
the procedure involved is analogous to that used in manual research.67
If a system were "so sophisticated that [from] facts fed into it
. . . the system draws legal conclusions," " the A.B.A. report recom-
mended that its use be restricted to lawyers. Since no computer has
yet been programmed to draw a legal conclusion, the report, in refer-
ring to the "system," is presumably referring to staff members whose
functions constitute part of the service rendered.
In the A.L.S. system, the burden of choosing appropriate words
for a search and constructing them into a search question lies wholly
upon the user-searcher. A staff member is called upon to exercise any
form of legal judgment only when introducing a new subscriber to the
service. The questions formed by the user may be criticized and
altered; 9 but even if it is assumed that the procedure amounts to a
significant exercise of legal judgment by the staff member, any prob-
lem can easily be eliminated by instructing new users in terms of hypo-
thetical rather than actual fact situations.
The L.R.S. system of operation, which permits the searcher to be
in direct contact with the computer via teletype, presumably involves
no post-indexing legal skill on the part of staff members.
7 ° Less
certain, however, is the status of the L.R.S. "Special Evaluation
Query." 71 This service calls for a statement of the factual background
of the searcher's problem. The subscriber, however, is responsible for
the initial analysis of the problem and must submit a question which
accurately frames the legal issues involved.' The factual statement
may assist the staff member to select the appropriate descriptor num-
67A layman, however he might jeopardize his endeavor, should not be restricted
from attempting to handle his own legal affairs. He has the right to appear in a legal
proceeding on his own behalf. See, e.g., State ex rel. Frohmiller v. Hendrix, 59 Ariz.
184, 190, 124 P.2d 768, 772 (1942) ; 28 U.S.C. § 1654 (1964) ; CoNN. GE. STAT. ANN.
§ 51-88 (1958); WAsH. REV. CoDE §2.48.190 (1961).
One possible qualification may, however, be appropriate. These services, if they
offer their product to laymen, should not allow the inference to be drawn through
advertising that the product will offer a legal solution to a particular problem. A dis-
claimer may be appropriate here. Cf. American Bar Association, Statements of Prin-
ciples with Respect to the Practice of Law 8 (Sept. 1, 1964).
6 American Bar Ass'n Standing Comm. on Unauthorized Practice of Law, An-
nual Report, 33 UNAUTHORIZED pRAcTIcE NEws 62, 70 (No. 1-2, 1967).
69 See note 26 supra and accompanying text.
70 But see note 39 supra.
71 See text accompanying notes 38-39 supra.
72The question form clearly indicates that the searcher is responsible for an initial
analysis of the factual context of the problem. A legal analysis is called for, since
only legally significant facts are entered on the form. See note 39 supra.
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bers and evaluate the relevance of the cases produced, but the primary
"legal" analysis is clearly done by the subscriber. More significant is
the fact that the service does not attempt to convey any legal analysis
to the user. The product of the "Special Evaluation Query" is the
same as that made available through direct teletype access to the L.R.S.
computer: case citations and, possibly, full text print-outs of the cases
cited. A lawyer-subscriber must perform his own "legal" analysis of
the resulting information.73 Therefore, application of the law to a
particular factual situation is not present in the L.R.S. product.
When a lawyer uses this research aid, it is clear that even if some
increment of legal analysis remained in the system, this analysis would
not be given to the "one requesting the service." 7" It was suggested
earlier that when an unlicensed law clerk prepared a memorandum for
a client, it would constitute practice, while the same memorandum
prepared for a lawyer-employer would not.75 What distinguishes the
two cases is that the advice given to the attorney does not concern his-
own personal affairs or affect his rights or liabilities, while the advice
given to his client is intimately concerned with his affairs. In this
situation, the computer analysis would play a role equivalent to that
of an unlicensed law clerk. The essential element of authorized legal
advice is preserved here: ultimate judgment comes from a licensed
attorney directly to his client on the basis of a professional relationship
which meets the requirements of the Canons of Professional Ethics.7
In other words, when asking "For whom is the service being ren-
dered ?" one should also ask "How will the advice affect the user ?" 77
This analysis in terms of the user, since it is not bound by the
simple dichotomy of the A.B.A. report (lawyer, non-lawyer), suggests
a wider access to the computer's analytical services. There are laymen
who have very good reasons for wishing to have access to the law.
A partial list would include penologists, sociologists, economists,
political scientists, law librarians, law students, and legislative re-
searchers.7' This class of users is usually characterized by an academic
73 But see note 39 supra.
74 See text accompanying note 61 supra.75 See text accompanying note 58 supra.7 8 See text accompanying notes 102-05 infra.
77 See text accompanying notes 60-63 supra.
78 On the use of computers by legislative researchers, see Note, Automation and
the Law: Challenge to the Attorney, 21 VAND. L. Rv. 228, 245-47 (1968).
Not considered here is the case of the layman who is interested in the passage or
repeal of legislation (whether as citizen or lobbyist) and who would like to know
whether a particular hypothetical situation is covered by existing law. Even though
he is not affiliated with any academic institution, his purpose is so akin to that of the
legislative researcher or the academic that he could lay claim to the academic excep-
tion. Policing such users to ensure that their claim of purely hypothetical interest was
valid might well be impossible; this would suggest that such non-affiliated laymen
should be denied access to analytical system despite their academic interest. See text
accompanying note 80 infra. An argument could be made, however, that the first
amendment protects the citizen's right to be informed about matters of political inter-
est. It would seem that such an argument could prevail only if neither manual research
tools nor non-analytic, "raw-text' computer services were available.
COMPUTER RETRIEVAL
affiliation or purpose.79 If a system in which some element of legal
judgment is present is made available to laymen who are members of
a group characterized by some kind of academic affiliation for the
purposes of carrying out research, then it is also true that the one
requesting the service will not have his legal rights or duties explained,
altered or commented upon. Giving them access to computerized re-
trieval facilities even in those cases where some increment of legal
judgment may be called for will not only insure that these individuals
will be able to draw upon the law, but also may spare them some of
the time and expense of legal research which can be a great burden on
any legally-related research project."0 For the kind of service exempli-
fied by the L.R.S. "Special Evaluation Query" therefore, academicians
as well as lawyers should be considered proper users.
The kind of service typified by a mixed law-fact or straight fact
query, however, should be restricted to the lawyer-academician class of
user. Even if the "product" contains no explanation or analysis of the
law, but merely case citations, the fact that the system provides the
layman with a selection of sources from a large data-bank would
probably be grounds for an inference that this information supplies the
"answer" to his problem. Even if the system offers adequate dis-
claimers the probability is great that the layman would nonetheless
regard the information as dispositive. If a system in which there is a
small residue of legal judgment cannot in substance be denominated
the practice of law, the fact that laymen might treat it as such, in
conjunction with the earlier "user" analysis, should be sufficient
grounds for excluding laymen from its class of proper users.
The above discussion does not, however, exhaust all relevant
considerations. The assumption of the A.B.A. report that "detailed
legal analysis" would constitute "practice" raises additional problems
in terms of "authorization."
Authorization
In the early development of case law, the authorization test was
quite simple-attorneys at the bar were authorized by the courts and
79 [M]any economists have become recognized experts on the anti-trust laws
and numerous political scientists have studied legislative reapportionment and
redistricting. In a somewhat different manner, social scientists want to know
about the law in action in order to study the judicial process. Their research
efforts using reported decisions are very important scholarly activities.
Freed, Computer Law Searching: Problems for the Layman, DATAmATION, Oct., 1967,
at 41.
80 It is of course possible that an academic user may use an analytical system to
obtain legal information which may be of some personal value-i.e., to explain or
clarify his personal rights or liabilities. Access for academic users could be conditioned
upon their signing a statement, incorporated on standard subscriber forms, to the effect
that the information requested is not of such a kind as will be of personal use to the
subscriber. In any event, to the extent that the purpose of the limitations on the
practice of law is to protect the untutored layman from incompetent legal service, it
would seem that the academic user is far less in need of this protection: he of all
persons should be aware of the dangers of unskilled legal advice.
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laymen were not. In time, however, even this simple distinction was
modified. Some courts held that minor services (such as filling out
a simple deed or lease) could be performed by laymen if such services
were "incidental" to the ordinary operation of their business (as it
would be in the case of real estate agents)-" In such cases the benefit
to the public in allowing these activities by laymen was thought to out-
weigh the public benefit in restricting the practice of law. The "inci-
dental" test, however, is clearly inapplicable to the commercial services
discussed above, since the services are part and parcel of one principal
product.
The lawyer-layman distinction does not exhaust the relevant
possibilities in this field. Both of the services described above are
corporations; corporations, according to the traditional rule, cannot
practice law.' In some states, the interdiction against corporate prac-
tice is a result of specific legislative enactment.' In the absence of any
specific legislation on the matter, courts have held, on the basis of
common law precedent, that corporations may not practice."4 The
reasoning of these decisions has been that the right to practice law is a
personal right,85 and that a corporation by its nature cannot meet the
necessary prerequisites for admission to the bar.
86
There are two generally recognized exceptions to the hornbook
rule against corporate practice. The first is the "incidental" test men-
tioned above in connection with the practice of law by laymen.87
Although this theory has been invoked to permit some forms of cor-
porate practice, 88 it would not be applicable to retrieval services since
81 See, e.g., Conway-Bogue Realty Inv. Co. v. Denver Bar Ass'n, 135 Colo. 398,
415-16, 312 P.2d 998, 1007 (1957) (such "incidental" work could be done at the request
of customers in connection with transactions already being handled, and without separate
charge). But see Gardner v. Conway, 234 Minn. 468, 48 N.W.2d 788 (1951) (ac-
countant employed to prepare tax returns cannot deal with "difficult or doubtful ques-
tions" concerning the interpretation of tax statute).
82 See, e.g., Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 194 N.E. 313 (1935) ; Boykin
v. Hopkins, 174 Ga. 511, 162 S.E. 796 (1932). This should be distinguished from the
legitimate functions of house counsel, who serve the legal interests of the corporation
only.8 3 See, e.g., N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 484 (McKinney Supp. 1967); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 84-5 (1965) ; PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 17, § 1608 (1962).
8 4 See, e.g., In re Co-operative Law Co., 198 N.Y. 479, 92 N.E. 15 (1910) (de-
cided before passage of a statute which expressly prohibited corporate practice).
85 See, e.g., Clark v. Austin, 340 Mo. 467, 478, 101 S.W.2d 977, 982 (1937);
Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 613, 194 N.E. 313, 316-17 (1935).
88 These prerequisites are usually specified as good character and the taking of
the oath of admission. See Boykin v. Hopkins, 174 Ga. 511, 521, 162 S.E. 796, 800
(1932) ; Opinion of the Justices, 289 Mass. 607, 194 N.E. 313 (1935). This formal-
istic reasoning has been criticized for lacking in articulated policy what it possesses in
internal logical consistency. See Lewis, Corporate Capacity to Practice Law--A Shtdy
in Legal Hocus Pocus, 2 MD. L. Rav. 342 (1938). The rationale behind this prohibi-
tion is in accord with that advanced by the Canons of Ethics. See note 105 infra and
accompanying text.
87 See text accompanying note 81 supra.88 See Bar Ass'n v. Union Planters Title Guarantee Co., 46 Tenn. App. 100, 326
S.W.2d 767 (1959), which permitted "incidental" practice, even though corporate
practice was prohibited by TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-303 (1955). The court held that a
real estate corporation was permitted to engage in the "incidental" practices of title
searching, drafting of deeds and the preparation of escrow agreements.
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their activities discussed above are their main product and not an
incidental service.
The second major exception to the prohibition of corporate
practice arises from a recent United States Supreme Court decision
which vacated a state court's order prohibiting a union from employing
attorneys to serve its members." The Court held that the prohibition
of the union's practice of law was "not needed to protect the State's
high standards of legal ethics." " However, the constitutional basis
for that decision is completely absent from the commercial setting of
retrieval services.9 '
The prohibition against corporate practice has also disappeared in
those states which have amended the rule and the corresponding Canons
to permit attorneys, subject to stipulations,92 to incorporate what were
formerly their partnerships.9" To date, however, none of the com-
mercial retrieval agencies are located in those states in which such an
exception has been made. However, even if they were, the nature
of the stipulations makes it clear that they contemplate incorporation
of a traditional law firm and that the retrieval services, in their present
form, could not comply with them.
The statement of the A.B.A. Committee on Unauthorized Practice,
mentioned earlier, noted that when a "system becomes so sophisticated
that facts are fed into it from which the system draws legal conclusions
based on specific legal analysis, it would involve the practice of law." '
This would seem to imply that a system which integrated specific legal
analysis in its product always involves the practice of law. All of the
services discussed are presently incorporated and, given the above
analysis, if found to be involved in the practice of law would run afoul
of the prohibition against corporate practice and would, therefore, be
prevented from offering their product to either lawyers or laymen.
This problem is exemplified by a recent New Jersey Ethics de-
cision requested by two attorneys who proposed to form a corporation
89 United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967).
90 Id. at 225.
91 A constitutional question might arise, however, if computerized legal services
were to be offered to groups otherwise unable to obtain legal services-if, for example,
the N.A.A.C.P. were to offer an analytic computer service to indigent Negroes.
92 See ABA Comm. ON PROFFSSIONAL ETHICS, OPINIONs, No. 303 (1967). These
stipulations are generally that
(1) The individual lawyer must remain personally responsible to the
client, and the client must be advised of the limited liability of the partners.
(2) The centralized management must remain exclusively in the hands
of lawyers.
(3) None of the shareholders in the corporation may be non-lawyers.
S See In re Florida Bar, 133 So.2d 554 (Fla. 1961). Similar provisions have
been adopted in Colorado. See Bye & Young, Law Firi Incorporation in Colorado,
34 ROCKY MT. L. Rrv. 427 (1962).
4 American Bar Ass'n Standing Comm. on Unauthorized Practice of Law, An-
nual Report, 33 UNAUTHORIZED PRACE NEWS 62, 70 (No. 1-2, 1967).
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which would offer research and brief-writing services to fellow law-
yers."5 The articles of incorporation and the by-laws included pro-
visions to keep all such services confidential, and to develop and use
all types of information and retrieval services. 6 The Ethics Committee
determined that the proposed activity was improper, holding first that
legal research and brief writing-"the very foundation of all law
practice"-constitute the practice of law and, second, that New Jersey
rules of court prohibit corporate practice.17  New Jersey attorneys are
specifically forbidden by canon 9 from aiding or encouraging the un-
authorized practice of law, which in this case, would be practice by a
corporation.
Two considerations suggest that this opinion leaves much to be
desired. First, the analysis of user set forth above " suggested that an
essential element of the practice of law was the rendering of advice
which was designed to clarify or alter the legal rights of the person
receiving it.' Because a research product incorporating detailed legal
analysis would not be given for the purpose of affecting the attorney-
subscriber's rights, the service given to other lawyers should not be
denominated practice.'0 1 The client who will be the eventual recipient
of the legal information is protected; before it is conveyed to him, it
will be "filtered" through the judgment and skill of the attorney-
subscriber.
Closely associated with the first is a second criticism of the New
Jersey Ethics decision: that it does not advance the policy against
corporate practice. The often unarticulated rationale behind the pro-
hibition against corporate practice is implicit in Canon 35 of the
American Bar Association Canons of Professional Ethics.102 This
95 Ethics Opinion No. 101, 89 N.J.L.J. 801 (1966).
96 Id.
W Id.
98 Id. Canon 47 speaks directly to the involvement of lawyers in unauthorized
practice:
No lawyer shall permit his professional services, or his name, to be used in
the aid of, or to make possible, the unauthorized practice of law by any lay
agency, personal or corporate.
ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICs No. 47.
19 See notes 61-62 supra and accompanying text.
100 See note 62 supra and accompanying text.
101 This service is analogous to that rendered by an unlicensed law clerk. But see
note 106 infra.
102 The official status of the Canons varies from state to state. They are binding
on all members of the bar association (Most state bar canons are in pari materia with
the ABA Canons; only the latter will be discussed here). In some states with an
integrated bar, they are binding on all lawyers by statute, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2.48.230 (1961), or by rules of court. See, e.g., Integration of the Bar, 273 Wis.
281, 77 N.W.2d 602 (1956) ; Integration Rule of the Florida Bar, 40 FLA. BAR J. 538
(1966). In other states the Canons may be enforced at the option of the court. See,
e.g., In re Heirich, 10 Ill. 2d 357, 386-87, 140 N.E.2d 825, 839-40 (1956), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 805 (1957) ; Hunter v. Troup, 315 Ill. 293, 302, 146 N.E. 321, 324 (1924).
However, prosecution for unauthorized practice and for violation of the Canons
are two different actions and must be separately brought. Touchy v. Houston Legal
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rule dictates that the relationship between lawyer and client should be
direct and personal, and should not admit of the interposition of any
lay agency, whether personal or corporate.Y3 Canon 35 contemplates
the situation in which a trust company introduces its client to one of
its own lawyers, or where a corporate executive seeks legal advice from
house counsel. °" The corporation or trust company is spoken of as
"intervening" between the lawyer and his "client." The purpose of
this Canon is to preserve a unity of interests between the lawyer and
his client and to avoid possible conflicts of interest between client and
employer. 03 There is no reason, however, why this relationship can-
not be maintained when a lawyer-subscriber is employing a commercial
service to do legal research for him. A memorandum of law submitted
to a lawyer should be as subject to his review and approval as a
memorandum prepared by an unlicensed law clerk. 6 Lawyers should,
therefore, be recognized as proper users of all such systems.
CONCLUSION
While the A.B.A. statement implicity recognizes that lawyers are
proper users, it does not go far enough. It was pointed out above'0 .
that a class of "academic" users are proper users. Any legal advice
given these users does not affect the rights of the person to whom
it is given; moreover, there are no lawyer-client relationships to protect
since this class is more interested in the product as "information" than
as "advice." For those systems which retain some increment of legal
analysis, therefore, the class of users denominated academic should be
considered proper, even though it cuts across the rigid lawyer-layman
lines of the A.B.A. statement.
The statement would clearly deny ordinary laymen seeking legal
advice access to a service embodying some form of legal analysis.
Foundation, 417 S.W.2d 625 (Tex. Ct App. 1967). A court may impose suspension
or complete disbarment on an attorney who violates the Canons. If he practices law
thereafter, he may be cited for contempt as would any other layman practicing law.
103 ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIoNAL ETHIcS No. 35 provides:
The Professional services of a lawyer should not be controlled or exploited by
any lay agency, personal or corporate, which intervenes between client and
lawyer. A lawyer's responsibilities and qualifications are individual. He
should avoid all relations which direct the performance of his duties by or in
the interest of such intermediary. A lawyer's relation to his client should be
personal, and the responsibility should be direct to the client....
But see United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967).104 See WISE, LEGAL ETHIcs 87-94 (1966).
105 See United Mine Workers v. Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217, 231-32
(1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
106 It is noteworthy that the New Jersey Ethics opinion speaks of the proposed
corporation's product as research and brief writing. One element distinguishing this
situation from present computerized research facilities is that briefs could be passed
on directly to a court and serve as substitutes for an attorney's own work. Memoranda
of law, the usual product of legal research, are much less likely to pass through an
attorney's hands without his scrutiny; certainly, mere citations or case printouts can-
not be passed on to court or client without some work on the part of the attorney-
subscriber.
'0 7 See text accompanying note 79 supra.
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Analysis in terms of the "user" would indicate that this is a correct
result since advice given directly to the person requesting it should
properly be considered practice. Moreover, the policy underlying the
unauthorized practice doctrine suggests that some restriction may be
warranted. One of the basic purposes of the unauthorized practice re-
striction is to secure a professional relationship between lawyer and
client, marked by a close personal association and a unity of interests.
A client is assured of a certain standard of competence and adherence
to a code of ethics when the person giving the legal advice must meet
educational and other requirements for admission to the bar and is
subject to disciplinary action for infraction of ethical standards. When
the product of a retrieval service embodying legal analysis is offered
to attorney-subscribers, the lawyer's client is nonetheless protected by
these standards, for the lawyer continues to be responsible for the
advice he passes on. In the case of academic users, there is no "client"
in the sense of one having his rights clarified or altered; information is
simply being disseminated. But a computerized retrieval service mak-
ing services embodying legal advice directly available to the layman
would not conform to these standards. A commercial enterprise is
particularly unadaptable to this professional setting when it provides
a standardized product through impersonal "staff" service and by
personnel who are unidentifiable for purposes of licensing and policing
adherence to ethical standards. 08 A commercial retrieval system which
has these characteristics and which incorporates in its product legal
analysis and judgment should, therefore, not be made accessible to the
ordinary layman.'" However, the traditional prohibition against
"corporate practice" should not be used to block the availability of
such services to lawyers. The rationale of this prohibition requires
no such result.
At the present time, it is the policy of both commercial services
discussed above to restrict their products to a particular class of users.
A.L.S. services only lawyers and legally related users,
J° while L.R.S.
108 Of particular interest to the legal profession at the present time is the prohibi-
tion of advertising or solicitation of legal business. See ABA CANONS OF PROFES-
SIONAL ETHics No. 27. Both of the services discussed above do carry on extensive
advertising, which at present involves no ethical ramifications since, under the analy-
sis above, they are not involved in the practice of law. If a system which incorporated
legal analysis and judgment were opened to laymen, the standards of the legal pro-
fession would be adversely affected if the advertising continued, not only because
standard services would be put at a competitive disadvantage, but also because modern
advertising has a tendency to create its own market.
109 In offering these conclusions this Comment does not purport to pass definitive
value judgments on the particular systems involved. Of greater interest at the mo-
ment are the general characteristics of these services as they make possible general
inferences of what other future services or commercial enterprises may offer.
110 Interview with A.L.S. staff member at the University of Pittsburgh, August
10, 1967. "Legally related" users includes state legislatures, law libraries, insurance
companies, professional associations, manufacturing and industrial associations. Auto-
mated Law Searching, Inc., Automated Statutory Reporter (undated pamphlet).
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restricts its product to lawyers."' The reason for this restriction is
partly economic: these services depend to a great extent on subscribers
who will be frequent users. The present cost of introducing new users
to the system does not make feasible the servicing of laymen whose
needs are usually met by single searches." 2 This, of course, is a
business judgment which these services may properly make. However,
one service has suggested that an additional reason for the exclusion
of most laymen was the "cloudy" ethical situation. Unless the un-
authorized practice and ethical ramifications are clarified, laymen may
be barred from access to computerized retrieval services; little will
be done to clarify that situation unless the present unauthorized practice
doctrine is defined in the light of possible future computer uses." 3
At the present time the exclusion of laymen presents no real
problem. Laymen who wish to have access to "the law" are few in
number, and present access to published materials seems adequate."
4
However, if commercial retrieval services enjoy financial success, and
fulfill their present promise of being a substantial improvement over
present methods of digesting and indexing, it is possible that the popu-
larity of manual retrieval will decline. Such a decline may well be
accompanied by an increasing unavailability of manual retrieval devices.
If such a situation comes to pass, exclusion of laymen from
automated retrieval systems may be a denial of their right to have
access to "the law." That such a right exists seems undeniable; "1 its
scope, however, is far less clear. Most of the litigation ..6 in the area
has been concerned with prisoners' rights; in such cases, the right of
access to the law has appeared as a corollary to the right to reasonable
II Interview with L.R.S. staff member, November 16, 1967.
112 Interview with A.L.S. staff member at the University of Pittsburgh, August
10, 1967.
113 A very strong argument for the general accessibility to all laymen has been
written by R. N. Freed, Division Counsel for Honeywell, Inc., Computer Control
Division. Freed, Combuter Law Searching: Problems for the Laynan, DATA AnTiON,
Oct., 1967, at 41.
114 Several states have made provision for manual access by laymen to legal
materials. This may be done by providing for deposit of state reporters in various
public libraries, e.g. N.Y. JUDIcIARY LAW § 434(6) (McKinney Supp. 1967); by
establishing county law libraries with provision for free and open access by the public,
e.g. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 81, § 81 (Smith-Hurd 1966); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 256.41
(Supp. 1967) ; or by providing that legislative journals and supreme court reports be
set aside for public use in the offices of a town clerk, CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 7-35
(Supp. 1966). The most liberal of these provisions is that of California, which estab-
lishes county law libraries, free to all residents of the county, to be supported by re-
ceipts from filing fees in the county courts. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6341 (West
1962); Drummond, Californids County Law Libraries, 48 A.B.A.J. 320 (1962).
115 The "notice" requirement of the void-for-vagueness doctrine-that a statute
must by its terms give fair notice to the persons affected thereby-would seem to have
as an inseparable corollary that the terms giving such fair notice must be reasonably
available. See generally Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme
Court, 109 U. PA. L. REv. 67, 82 n.79, 85-88 (1960).
3i1 The absence of litigation in the area may be due simply to the fact that inter-
ested laymen have always had reasonable access to both federal and state legal ma-
terials. Cf. note 114 supra.
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access to the courts guaranteed by the due process clause." 7 In such
circumstances, countervailing state interests (such as the need to
maintain prison discipline), not present when the person asserting the
right is not being held in confinement by the state, have usually won
the day." 8  At least one case," 9 however, has suggested that even
prisoners have some rights of access to legal materials, and the decision
has since received favorable comment.
20
It has already been mentioned 2' that presently-available manual
services seem to fulfill whatever are the constitutional requirements of
access for the layman. It is doubtful that any problem is likely to arise
in the future. One condition precedent to the eventual widespread
success of computerized retrieval may well be the elimination of any
element of legal judgment by members of an incorporated service. If
that element is eliminated, all laymen should, given the earlier analysis,
qualify as proper users of simple, full text systems. Should mechanized
operations become the common method of storing and retrieving legal
literature, the layman would enjoy as much or more access to the law
as he does at present.
"17 See Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546, 549 (1941) (access to federal court). Access
to state courts, apparently not compelled by the due process clause, Griffin v. Illinois,
351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956) (dictum), is protected against "arbitrary interference" by
prison officials by the equal protection clause. Dowd v. United States ex rel. Cook,
340 U.S. 206 (1951).
118 See, e.g., Walker v. Pate, 356 F.2d 502 (7th Cir. 1966).
19 Bailleaux v. Holmes, 177 F. Supp. 361 (D. Ore. 1959), rev'd on factual
grounds sub noin. Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290 F.2d 632, 640'(9th Cir. 1961) (insufficient
evidence of actual denial of access).
120 It seems that there should be a right-and of necessity a remedy-to
engage in legal research which is intimately connected with a prisoner's
access to the courts-especially when the prisoner is unable to procure counsel.
Note, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: The Developing Law, 110 U. PA. L. REv.
985, 993-94 (1962). Cf. Note, Legal Services for Prison Innuates, 1967 Wis. L. REv.
514, 523-24 (1967) (suggesting on the basis of personal experience that libraries ac-
cessible to prisoners are of minimal value).
-
2 1 See note 114 supra and accompanying text.
